Abstract: There are no unicorns, but there are representations of them, hence motivating an explanation of discourse about the property 'unicorn' in terms of discourse about representations of unicorns. I show how to extend this strategy to apply to any kind or property terms. References to property instances may be explained as references to comprehensive representations of them, which represent all of the (supposed) properties of such an instance--unlike 'ordinary' representations, which are distinctive in that they represent only some limited subset of such properties, through use only of some proper subset of their own (supposed) properties. This representationalist approach results in a very economical naturalist ontology, which has no need for properties.
However, at this juncture it might be thought that the current point about representations--that a representation of an X cannot itself be a real X--is already sufficient to undermine a representational explanation of generality involving kinds or qualities. For how could one explain how a real goat relates to the kind 'goat' in representational terms, given that no representation of a goat could be a real goat?
But perhaps the answer to that question may already have struck those having some sympathy with various conceptualist and nominalist alternatives to realist theories of universals. A representationalist approach to universals, if it is to be viable at all, must adopt an anti-realist (or 'irrealist') stance to supposed 'real' examples or instances of kinds or qualities--that is, it must deny that there are any real or genuine instances of kinds or qualities, 2 and hence deny that objects genuinely have or possess such properties. Thus for example, those objects generally assumed to be real goats must each be held merely to represent a goat, rather than itself to be a goat.
To be sure, realists may differ as to whether a property is genuinely present in all of its instances, or whether instead each instance is merely related to the property by an ontologically and logically unique relation of exemplification or instantiation: the language of objects 'having' or 'possessing' properties, or of being 'instances' of them, could be interpreted either way. My alternative to realism would equally replace either version: thus in arguing that there are no genuine instances of properties, I am both claiming that there are no properties that are present in objects, and that there are no properties to which objects are related by an instantiation relation. I shall also assume that, though perhaps there might be some properties without instances, there could not be properties if none of them have instances, and hence that properties in general may be dismissed if property instantiation can be undermined or replaced.
Returning to the representationalist view, its anti-realist stance does raise another problem for it, namely that the initial contrast between representational versus real cases of a universal would then itself be in question: how then could we distinguish 'ordinary'
or 'normal' representations, such as pictures, from whatever representational substitutes for instances of universals are provided by the approach?
Here is an initial answer to that question, which will be refined as the discussion proceeds. As a preliminary, define a 'natural kind' as a kind that has actual instances (that is, of course, supposed actual instances)--as opposed to conceptually or culturally defined kinds such as unicorns or centaurs, which have no actual instances.
Then in the first place, there is a perhaps obvious explanation as to why normal representations of a natural kind of object X are not themselves Xs, namely that they do not have a sufficient quantity of the properties of Xs to qualify as themselves being Xs.
For example, a painting of a child is not itself a child because it was not born of human parents, lacks those human organs possessed by a child, and so on. Thus normal representations of natural Xs fail to be Xs for the same reason as any other non-Xs, namely that they lack the required range of properties possessed by (supposed) genuine instances of X.
At the same time, and for reasons related to the just-discussed insufficiency of properties of normal representations, it is an important and little-remarked fact that such normal representations of a natural X do not represent all of the properties of a natural X, but only some of them. Thus an average picture of a child in an everyday setting would represent the child, but not the internal structure of her organs, or her blood type. Or in other words, normal representations of instances of natural kinds are incomplete representations, in that they fail to represent all of the properties of that which they represent.
Another To summarize, we have outlined one possible representationalist strategy for reinterpreting realist views about the relations of kinds and their instances in purely representational terms. And in doing so it has not been necessary to change the usual concept of representation itself--as involving potential representation both of particulars 6 and of universals--in that the needed distinction of NRs from CRs merely involved distinguishing different ranges of properties, both of the representing object (partiality versus wholeness), and of the object represented (incompleteness versus completeness).
Refinements of CR and NR
First, a logical and terminological interlude: since the somewhat unwieldy term 'representation' will continue to be much needed throughout this paper, I shall abbreviate it where appropriate as 'rep', which may be used in verb form ('A reps/is reping/repd B'
for 'A represents/is representing/represented B') or noun form ('A is a rep of B' for 'A is a representation of B', or 'a rep analysis' for 'a representational analysis'). Then a comprehensive rep (CR) is a C-rep, and a non-comprehensive rep (NR) is an N-rep.
(These new forms are also usable in verbal forms--such as 'A C-reps B'--unlike 'CR' and 'NR' themselves). As for my general representationalist approach or view itself, I shall describe it as the RT view.
Returning to more substantive matters, it is first necessary to conceptually distinguish issues about the nature of actual or real existence of entities, from issues about whether we can find an adequate RT substitute for talk about kinds or properties, whether in describing any real, actually existent entities or non-real entities such as unicorns. It is not primarily the job of an RT theory to analyze the nature of existence or reality as such, so that a working substitute for common realist (or everyday) intuitions on such matters is as much as can be hoped for in an initial treatment. (However, I shall tentatively identify one necessary factor below, to be called 'comprehensive specificity').
Second, so far the only cases of CR that have been discussed are C-reps of instances of natural kinds--that is, of kinds having actual instances. But I shall show below that there can also be C-reps of instances of non-natural kinds, such as of items from categories of mythological, non-existent creatures such as unicorns or centaurs.
That some such cases of rep of non-existent things occur is only to be expected on an RT approach, which is attempting to replace supposedly actual properties and instances with reps of them: to the extent that the approach is successful, the relevant represented properties and instances must be regarded as not existing, or as not being real. What has gone wrong here is not the RT analysis itself, since both realists and RT theorists can agree that runicorns fail to be genuine unicorns. It is rather something about the nature of existence or actuality, in connection with whatever the reasons are that some kinds (whether analyzed realistically or in an RT way) can fail to have actual examples, that produces the failure.
Call the missing reasons or factors 'existence-making' factors. Then an amended RT account of what it is for an object A to be a 'real' instance of kind X is that A C-reps an X, for any kind X that possesses the relevant existence-making factors--the primary evidence for the presence of which is that kind X is a natural kind as previously defined, namely a kind having actual instances.
However, it seems likely that one necessary existence-making factor is (what could be called) comprehensive specificity: that, for any general kind of property possessed by an X, X should possess some completely specific value of that property (using standards for complete specificity derived from relevant sample cases of actual objects). It seems plausible that unicorns are mythological (without any real examples) at least in part because we cannot describe with complete specificity the properties of any individual unicorn. Now whether or not that view of artworks is true, it seems plausible that at least in most artistic cases the results of an artist's creative effort (the finished artwork) has a limited, finite list of properties, such as in the case of a poem, musical work or drawing, so that it is possible to rep all of the artwork's properties--as in a good performance of a musical piece or play, or a reading of a poem. 7 However, if my speculation above about comprehensive specificity being necessary for real existence is correct, artworks with a limited or finite list of properties cannot really exist, i.e., there cannot be real instances of them. If this view is correct, it would provide a significant argument against 'type' theories of artworks, which regard at least some artworks as being types or kinds having real instances. 8 Assuming then that performances or readings are not real instances of the relevant artwork, it still needs to be decided whether they are partial or complete reps. I would argue that they are partial reps. For example, a concrete performance by a pianist of a piece of music involves many more events than simply the production of the desired sound: her repeated playing of a certain key, for instance, will inevitably involve mechanical stresses on the key that will result in a slight increase in its temperature, but such physical changes in the key play no role whatsoever in reping the music. Or the height and weight of an actor playing Hamlet have no representational role in his reping of Hamlet, because the play Hamlet is non-specific about Hamlet's height and weight.
Hence, to sum up this part, I conclude that reps of artworks can be both partial and Thus the category of N-reps has now been expanded to cover all non-CR cases of reps.
Also noteworthy is that all N-rep cases involving singular rep are partial reps (either partial/incomplete or partial/complete), the significance of which point will be explored in Section 7.
More RT Theory
It is now possible to be more explicit about some central features of the present RT account. To begin, the RT account is itself centered round the notion of a rep of a particular instance of a universal or property. One very good reason for this feature is that without it no sense could be made of the basic notion of a comprehensive rep (CR) of an instance, which is defined in terms of rep of all of the properties of the instance in question.
I have used the concept of a rep of an object or property as a basic or relatively primitive concept, defined only by the characteristic that a rep of X is not itself an X --whether an object or a property. (Later in this Section I clarify basic rep of properties as specific rep--i.e., rep of a property in its most specific form). Thus each property is repd in the same basic sense, independently of the secondary concepts of NR or CR.
Second, for any given property that is repd in the basic sense, the concepts of NR and CR themselves concern properties associated with that given property--namely, either some of, or the whole range of, other properties that would co-occur in some instance of the given property. For example, a C-rep of a genuine instance of redness would require rep of all of the properties associated with redness in the particular case of that instance of redness, such as (most relevantly) its specific hue, saturation and brightness. A (purportedly) genuine instance of redness would rep all those properties, whereas an NR case, such as a black and white photograph of a red surface, would only rep some of those properties, such as by omitting rep of the specific hue associated with the color.
An intermediate case should also be mentioned, namely that of how such a black and white or 'grayscale' photograph reps the saturation and brightness of a color. Some colors such as yellow are inherently brighter than others such as blue, so that an increase in saturation of the blue hue might decrease the average brightness of a black/white rep of it, while a similar increase for yellow would instead lead to a corresponding increase in brightness. As a result, a grayscale rep of a color cannot rep a specific saturation and brightness of a given color (since the hue is unknown or unrepd), but only an equivalence-class of such cases, which map onto the same shade of gray in the grayscale rep of the color.
Thus, though the grayscale rep does, in a sense, 'represent' the saturation and brightness of a color, it does so only in a 'fuzzy' or generic way by reping generic rather than specific values of saturation and brightness for colors. Hence of course my CR requirement, for 'real' or any other Xs, must be understood as requiring that such an object reps all of the properties of an X in their most specific form, so as to avoid 'false positive' cases in which all properties are repd, but some of them merely generically. And more generally, the concept of basic rep itself must be limited to specific reps, since only this concept captures the desired sense of singular rep of a given specific property (as opposed to 'fuzzy' or generic rep of an equivalence-class of specific properties). 9 Furthermore, the account I have given of NR and CR is general enough--in terms of a property versus its relative complement in a given instance--to apply to any kinds of properties, whether generic or specific, determinable (such as color) or determinate (such as red), and complex (such as goathood) or simple (such as brightness).
Thus, though an RT theory denies that there are any actual instances of properties, and hence denies that there are any actual or real properties as such as well, the theory need not deny that there can be reps of properties. Thus, from a meta-theoretic perspective, an RT theory would claim that the concept of 'an instance of a property' is empty (in that no actual entity satisfies the concept), as is too the concept of 'a property'. But we can still have reps (including linguistic reps) of non-actual (including potential or possible) members of the extension of such concepts, even though their actual extensions are empty.
As for the general form of my argument against properties, it could be expressed as follows: if there are properties, then there are (at least some) instances of properties. But there are no instances of properties. Hence there are no properties. Or, in more qualified form: it is not necessary to assume that there are instances of properties, since a satisfactory rep substitute is available. Hence it is not necessary to assume that there are
properties.
An extended formulation would make use of the concept of 'being a property' as being a third or higher order entity; 10 for example, since goathood (a second order entity) is a property, then 'goathood' must be an instance of the third order entity 'being a property', or propertyhood.
Then my argument is that goathood, as with other second order properties, have been
shown not to be genuine properties because they have no instances; hence they cannot themselves be genuine instances of propertyhood. Hence the extension of the concept of propertyhood is empty.
Thus, in sum, on the RT theory a particular 'goat' may correctly be described as 'a goat' in virtue of its being a CR of a goat, whose (represented) properties are those conventionally assumed to be instantiated by the supposed actual goat. (Further issues as to the status of a represented goat itself will be discussed in the next Section).
Generality, Particularity and Indiscernibility
Among other things, here is a brief discussion of an important metaphysical issue that was not raised in the previous Section. Suppose that there are two objects that are indiscernible (having exactly the same properties). A realist view of the situation is that there are two numerically distinct particulars, each being an instance of exactly the same specific kind X. Thus on a realist analysis this is a genuine example of generality, that is, of more than one object being an instance of the same specific kind. But what should an
RT view say about this case?
The pattern of translation from realism to RT constructs so far has been: any features a realist attributes to actual instances should be attributed to repd instances instead. Thus on this model (or translation scheme), if a realist has numerically distinct but indiscernible entities, then the RT translation should be that the two objects in question each C-rep numerically distinct particulars having the same properties.
However, the two objects of course also C-rep the same properties in each case, including each numerically distinct repd particular's property of being an X. So the RT account does preserve the 'intuition of generality' that both objects are C-reps of the same property or kind.
Nevertheless, the RT analysis also enables us to analyze away the concept of numerical identity, which concept is complementary to that of qualitative or property identity. For on the RT analysis, rather than having to say that two objects are themselves actually numerically distinct, in spite of their having the same properties, we can instead say that they are distinct or non-identical--without the identity in question being qualified as either numerical or qualitative--because each C-reps a numerically distinct particular. Or in other words, on an RT theory we do not need any actual cases of numerical distinctness or identity any more than we need actual cases of property distinctness or identity.
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This concludes my discussion of issues concerning C-rep, generality and particularity.
However, an RT theory also permits the introduction of another significant category of generality, which involves N-reps of particular objects rather than C-reps of them. As has just been seen, in effect, any C-reps of particular objects are such that there could be at most one C-rep of a given particular (since on the RT theory, any object C-reps a numerically distinct particular from that C-repd by any other object, instead of its being a numerically distinct particular itself). However, there is no such restriction for N-reps, of which there could be many for any given particular object.
As an example of N-rep of a particular object such as an actual person, the president of a country might decide not to attend an international conference herself, but instead to send a representative in her stead, who would then represent her at the conference. But of course she could also have multiple representatives to represent her in different countries, for example.
Or, to introduce a very different kind of N-rep, there could be many different photographs of the president in question, each of which is another kind of N-rep of her.
(Which may or may not specifically be photographic artworks, as discussed in Section 1).
As for the various distinct physical prints or copies of a particular such photograph, I
have argued elsewhere that such prints are instances of a visual design type associated with, though not identical with, the photograph in question. 12 Each such print is also an N-rep of the photograph itself (a partial but complete rep).
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Thus, to summarize these points, on my view a photograph--some but not all of which are artworks--is not itself a type or kind that can have actual instances (even though it is associated with a design type), but instead it is an abstract particular, of which there can be many prints or copies, which are partial complete (PC) N-reps of it--and which photograph typically will itself in turn be an N-rep of some other particular entity such as an actual person or scene.
External, Quasi-External and Internal Representation
There is one further important aspect of the concept of representation that still needs to be discussed. Consider a painting of a lake. Now there are two kinds of paintings of lakes:
those in which the lake in question actually exists, versus others in which there is no actual lake that is represented by the painting.
14 But all of these paintings--of both kinds--are nevertheless representations of a lake, whether or not there is some actual lake represented by a given painting.
Thus there clearly is a need to distinguish the actual subject X (if any) of a rep, such as an actual lake, from 'the X', such as 'the lake', represented in the painting, which is repd by the painting whether or not there is an actual subject X. I shall distinguish these two aspects or varieties of representation as external versus internal representation (ER versus IR).
External rep could also be described as relational rep, since if A externally reps B then there is an actual relation of representation that holds between actual entities A and B;
whereas internal rep involves no such actual relation. However, it is theoretically convenient to regard internal rep as also relational in a broader sense, as relating the
reping object A to what it reps B, even if there is no such actual object B.
A similar distinction is needed for properties: if A reps property B, then since my thesis is that there are no actual or real instances of properties, of course there cannot be external reps of property instances, i.e., objects actually having properties. Hence the concept of an internal representation is an indispensable component of an RT theory of generality, since it is needed in the case of at least some references to objects and properties. 15 A concept related to that of internal rep is common in the literature, namely that of the subject matter or representational content (RC) of a reping object, 16 which the object in some way possesses, or which characterizes it, whether or not there is any corresponding actual subject of the rep.
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Another common way to describe the 'representational content' or RC of a rep A that reps X, is to say that it consists of those properties that A represents X as having. However, this characterization does not adequately distinguish cases in which the 'X' in question involves a reference to an actual entity that is externally repd by A, as opposed to an object internally repd by A, 17 One further concept is needed. Though there cannot be ERs of properties for the reasons already given, we still need a concept to allow for the pre-theoretical sense in which one object can rep the properties of another object. On my account, these are cases when one object A reps property items in the RC of the other object B; I shall describe such cases as cases of quasi-external rep (QER or QE-rep)). 18 The concepts both of IR and QER (and the auxiliary concept of RC) are also needed because they plays an indispensable part in explaining how incorrect rep of an actual object X is possible--for A may rep an actual object X as having properties which in fact X does not possess. Hence, though it is primarily object A that externally reps X, there is a derivative sense in which it is the properties in A's RC that QE-rep (the relevant properties of) X. For example, if A incorrectly reps the water of an actual lake X as being red, then it is the 'red water' properties in the RC of A that are incorrectly representing the relevant color properties in the RC of X, that pre-theoretically are 'the actual color' of the water of lake X.
A Clarification of Comprehensive Representation
In the case of comprehensive reps (CRs), I have claimed that these are cases such that all the properties of an object play a role in representing all the properties of a kind or universal. But that statement now needs to be reinterpreted or clarified in the light of the Section 4 distinction between internal and external representation.
To begin, recall from the Introduction that a representationalist (RT) approach to universals, if it is to be viable at all, must adopt an anti-realist (or 'irrealist') stance to supposed 'real' examples or instances of kinds or qualities--that is, it must deny that there are any real or genuine instances of kinds or qualities, and hence deny that objects genuinely have or possess such properties. (Thus for example, those objects generally assumed to be real goats must each be held merely to represent a goat, or goathood, rather than itself to be a goat). Also, if no universals are ever instantiated, then a thoroughgoing anti-realism must reject the whole picture of there being entities--universals or properties--that have instances, and hence it must reject both the instances and the universals. Hence an RT view must deny that objects ever externally represent universals or properties.
An RT view will instead regard properties either as being 'internally represented' by an object A, that is, as being part of the object's representational content (RC), or--in the case of N-reps of actual objects--as being quasi-externally repd (QE-repd) properties in the RC of some other object B, as discussed in the previous Section.
But we have not yet integrated these points with the demand that objects should be comprehensive reps (CRs) of the properties or universals associated with a given repd
object. In what sense can all the properties of an object play a role in representing all of the properties associated with a given instance of a kind or other universal?
Clearly the concept of a CR needs to be reinterpreted in light of the fact that now, strictly speaking, there are no actual properties whatsoever (whether as independent universals or as associated with instances), so that any apparent reference to a property is really a reference to part of the representational content (RC) of some object. Hence now all the properties of an object are part of its RC (so that an object 'has' any properties just in the sense that it internally represents them, or has them as part of its RC). Thus the RC in question is a comprehensive RC (a CRC), a concept that will be useful in distinguishing the RC of CRs from that of NRs (see the next Section).
This new understanding of properties is consistent with the demand that a CR should represent all of the properties associated with a kind or quality, because the CRC of an object will include all of the rep content that, on a realist view, would consist of all of the properties associated with the relevant kind or quality.
A reinterpretation--or at least a clarification--is also needed for the requirement that all of the properties of an object A should play a role in representing the relevant kind or quality. This now needs to be interpreted in a minimal way such that the concept of a property 'playing a role in representing X'--or of functional relevance to X-rep--is satisfied by a property being itself part of the relevant comprehensive RC (CRC) of the object. For this minimal interpretation still enables a clear distinction to be made between singular CR and NR cases, in that in NR cases, some of the properties of an object are irrelevant to its rep of a given thing X, while others are representing rather than represented properties, and hence both groups are not part of the relevant RC associated with the object's being a normal rep of X--on which more in the next Section.
Normal Representations Again
At this stage it is necessary to clarify the theoretical situation with respect to normal or non-comprehensive representations (NRs), given the recent developments in comprehensive representation (CR) theory. The following property-related entities must initially be distinguished, for a normal rep A of some actual object X.
1) Those properties of A that are irrelevant to A's representing of X--its irrelevant
properties or IPs.
2) Those properties of A that play some relevant part in its representing of X--its representing properties or RGs.
3) Those properties of A that are included in A's representational content with respect to its representing of X--its represented properties (RDs). 19 Now at this stage there are two fundamentally different ways to proceed. The first would take the line that the properties referred to in 1) and 2) are those included in the comprehensive rep content (CRC) of A, so that NR cases make use of those same repd
properties. On such an analysis, the properties in an N-rep's own RC, as referred to under 3) above, would be doubly repd properties--repd by properties that are themselves repd properties. Call this the 'joint RC' approach.
Now there is no logical difficulty in this 'joint' approach, 20 and it does conform to the intuition that an object's ability to N-rep other things depends on a proper analysis of what its 'real' properties are. But it would also introduce an asymmetry into the relations of CR and NR cases, in that it would no longer be strictly true that it is a physical object
A that both C-reps a kind A, and is also capable of itself N-reping something else.
Further, since a major point of an RT theory is to regard actual objects, events and processes as ontologically primary and self-sufficient without properties, it would, if possible, be best to assign the very basic function of N-reping things to such primary objects, events and processes themselves, rather than to repd substitutes. Hence I shall do so, as follows. This alternative approach could be called the 'distinct RC' approach.
As a first point, the intuition mentioned above--that an object's ability to N-rep other things depends on a proper analysis of what its 'real' properties are--can be defused. On the RT view, talk about an object's properties is not talk about anything real or substantial, and so the pre-theoretic view that N-rep depends on an object's properties is itself in need of analysis.
Here is a rough schema for such an analysis. Objects have physical parts or aspects, so that one can distinguish, for instance, between those parts of a three-dimensional object--such as various configurations of its molecules--that are found on its front side, versus those parts that instead are found on its rear side. An example may help to clarify how this 'distinct RC' (DRC) approach would work.
Suppose that A is a painting--so that it C-reps a painting--which is also an N-rep of a yellowish beach X. A natural way of describing the situation is to say that there is a yellowish area on the front of painting A which reps the yellowish beach X. Now the DRC approach would accept this natural description as being correct: it is a subset of the parts of A, namely the yellowish area on the front of A, that N-reps the beach X. 21 Thus the DRC approach uses the fact that one important function of property terms (though not the only function) is to identify or pick out such parts or aspects of a concrete object. (I shall briefly discuss this example further in Section 10). But there is more that needs to be said. Realist views involve a uniqueness requirement, namely that there must be a unique set of all of the properties of an object (so that there could not be two distinct such sets of properties for the same object). An equivalent RT theory uniqueness principle is needed to rule out the abstract possibility that a given object A might support two distinct cases of C-rep: one in which one particular species of object is C-repd by (all the properties or parts of) A, and another in which a distinct particular species of object is C-repd by the same object A. Now in both realist and RT cases, more is needed to secure uniqueness than an objectivity postulate, namely that there is some fact of the matter as to what properties an object has, or what properties it reps. Why should it not be objectively true that an object has two distinct property sets, or that it C-reps two distinct particular species?
A Logical
The answer in both cases is that a requirement of logical consistency or compatibility would be violated, that hence serves to enforce uniqueness in both theoretical perspectives. For two distinct maximal property sets for an object would be such that any differences in each could be resolved into pairs of incompatible properties, such as yellow in one but blue in the other. No object can be both yellow and blue, and hence the internal integrity of either set would be undermined by the existence of the other.
But a similar point holds for RT constructs too: a claim that object A C-reps yellow would similarly be undermined by a claim that the object also C-reps blue (since it would be being claimed that an object both C-reps yellow and C-reps not-yellow). Hence I conclude that uniqueness holds for RT constructs just as much as for realist constructs, so that, as in the corresponding realist case, no object could C-rep more than one particular species of the same general kind, so that the disjointness condition holds for C-rep too.
Turning now to N-rep cases, I claim that a corresponding disjointness principle for Nreps--that no object could N-rep more than one particular species of the same general kind--is false. The reason is simple: singular N-reps, since they are partial reps (see 
An RT View of Recognition and Information
As further (though here necessarily brief) intuitive support for the RT approach, consider two concepts that are important in realist explanations of generality: those of recognition and information (or knowledge). Realist theories explain how it is possible to recognize different objects as each being an X in terms of recognition of a common property in each case. But this ignores the fact that recognition of an X works just as well in N-rep cases, such as recognizing a horse when one sees a picture of a horse--and indeed, children can learn to recognize all kinds of things through first learning to recognize pictures of them.
Thus an RT account of recognition is more general, and more cognitively realistic (in terms of how cognitive recognition skills are actually acquired and used) than is a comparable realist account of it.
And second, a realist theory of properties presumably is intended also to explain how we can epistemically acquire certain kinds of information about objects--that we can come to know that an object is red because of the causal effects of its property of being red on our perceptual apparatus, for example. But an RT account can provide a fully equivalent view: one perceptually acquires sufficient information to recognize that an object C-reps the color red by means of the same causal process, but without having to say that the causal process involves an object's property of being red--equally good science, but without the metaphysical baggage of properties.
The Representational Function of General Terms
To conclude with some additional defense of the present RT approach, here is an RT view of the utility of our using property-related concepts and terms in our descriptions of the world, beginning with some further discussion of picture A from Section 6.
Recall that the 'distinct RC' approach accepts the natural description of painting A, according to which there is a yellowish area on its front, which area (or subset of parts of A) reps the yellowish beach X--so that one important function of property terms (though not the only function) is to identify or pick out such parts or events connected with a concrete object. Now in order for property concepts to successfully fulfill that function, there has to be some objective correlation between a given property term (or combination of terms) and some relevant object parts. But the primary insight of an RT theory is that the correlation in question is not dependent specifically on the existence of real properties instantiated by things, for the correlation can be obtained just as well by making use of some other kind of objective fact about objects and their parts.
The objective fact used by an RT theory is that certain objects, or their parts, represent--whether in CR or NR ways--certain other objects and properties. Now of course, there is a large cultural or interpretive overlay to such objective, basic cases of rep--but the same is true for claims about the properties of objects too, so reps are no worse off than properties in the face of this perturbing factor.
Thus a language-user who can learn to recognize which objects, or combinations of parts, represent which other objects or repd properties, can then use the language of properties--reinterpreted as a language about repd properties--to identify the relevant objects and parts, just as well as could a language-user in a world in which there were real properties and instances of them.
So far we have considered only a 'coarse-grained' function of property terms--of their use to identify parts or physical aspects of objects. Turning now to other functions of property terms, of course the same terms may also be used to identify more fine-grained aspects of such parts, such as the intensity or hue of the light involved in a given event of light refraction by an object.
But here too an RT analysis can achieve an equivalent result to a realist analysis: just as property terms can identify finer-grained aspects of objects or events, so too can reps (by the relevant parts or physical aspects of an object) of such properties achieve the same result. Hence, in sum, the positing of real properties of objects of objects is revealed as an unnecessarily rich hypothesis, ripe for representationalist pruning, whether in coarsegrained or fine-grained uses of property terms.
